354

Book Review
Reviewed by Lea Vaughn
Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Modern Mind: Consciousness and Responsibility in
American Legal Culture, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2016:
pp. 400, $46.50 (cloth)

Leaves, Leaves, lean forth and tell me what I am.
—Theodore Roethke, “The Sequel,” The Far Field
“There are three things that might be meant by ‘the emergence of the
modern mind’: ﬁrst, the emergence of modern ways of thinking about the
universe; second, the emergence of modern conceptions of the mind; and third,
the emergence of the mind itself with its distinctive human characteristics.”1
The very ambiguity of this attributive property, or deﬁnitional conundrum,
hints at the diﬃculty of writing about the mind, and by necessary implication,
human nature. Add to this that “the mind” is contested territory. Generations
of theologians, philosophers, scientists and doctors, and jurists have fought
over which discipline will control the deﬁnitional contours of “the mind.”
For the law, who controls the act of deﬁning “the mind” and the scope of
its deﬁnition is fraught with consequence. The presence of a capable mind,
however deﬁned, marks the boundaries of legal culpability in both criminal
and civil law.
Into this thicket walks legal historian Susanna Blumenthal, and in a
masterful study titled Law and the Modern Mind,2 simultaneously both describes
Lea Vaughn is a Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law.
1.

Colin McGinn, Groping Toward the Mind, N.Y. REV. BOOKS , June 23, 2016, at 67. Like the
book reviewed here, the two books addressed in McGinn’s review survey the emergence of
“the modern mind.” His review raises some of the same questions Blumenthal asks: “Was
madness a matter of possession by demons and lapses into vice, and hence the province
of theology and the clergy, or was it a matter for medical men trained in anatomy and
physiology?” Id. Similarly, Blumenthal casts this as a dialogue between law and medicine,
including the nascent ﬁeld of psychology. As such, she is raising McGinn’s second category—
the emergence of modern, and arguably secular, conceptions of the mind.

2.

SUSANNA L. BLUMENTHAL, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (2016) [hereinafter LMM]. Note
that Blumenthal intentionally borrows the same title from Jerome Frank’s LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930). As Frank did with his book, Blumenthal seeks to upset the apple cart
of legal certainty. To the extent that they both look at the law as actually decided, rather than
ﬁt it into a particular legal theory, their books have a certain similarity. That is, both writers
focus on the subjectivity of the law, and on individual cases and jurists. While Frank focused
on the judge, Blumenthal looks at the judicial product in an attempt to see how the product
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the battles among scientists, doctors, and jurists in the period following the
Revolutionary War and up through the Gilded Age, and takes on traditional
scholarship in legal history as to who this person or “mind” is. Her study not
only provides an alternative account of the formation of American character,
but also provides a series of detailed portraits of the various turning points
in the formation of that character, and the legal determination of capable,
accountable personhood.
This review essay will proceed in three parts followed by a conclusion that
assesses the success and contribution of her work. The ﬁrst section sketches
her approach to legal history and her point of view. Professor Blumenthal
takes on the monumental task of challenging the received wisdom of legal
historians such as Willard Hurst. Second, this review will paint a condensed
portrait of Blumenthal’s methodology. Her book and its underlying analysis
draw on a breathtaking base of source materials: Hundreds of cases, treatises,
and biographical notes are woven into her observations. The careful depiction
and analysis of these materials is central to establishing her thesis: that the
traditional account of the development of American law, as a unitary response
deﬁnes consciousness and a deﬁnition of legally accountable actors. Whether Blumenthal
wishes to be seen as writing in that realist tradition, however, remains to be seen. That
she resists categorization appears more clearly in her 1998 article; her description of Frank
applies equally to herself:
To create, Jerome Frank pronounced in Law and the Modern Mind, was emphatically the
province and duty of the judiciary. Setting himself in opposition to the nineteenthcentury legal tradition, Frank exposed the discretionary, unpredictable nature of the
judicial process. He derided previous generations for their idealizing tendencies,
which had led them to posit the existence of a superhuman, passionless judge—
one who mechanically applied a stationary and certain set of legal rules to the cases
brought before him. This vision of adjudication was nothing more than an illusion,
Frank maintained, and persisting belief in it was explicable in psychological terms.
Susanna L. Blumenthal, Law and the Creative Mind, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 151, 152 (1998)
(citations omitted). Her 1998 article also announces themes that underlie much of the book
under review. As she stated in that article:
The third and most recent line of historical scholarship questions the very utility of
such labels as “instrumentalism,” “formalism,” and “realism,” providing illustrations
of their inadequacy as applied to a particular individual or historical era, and, in some
cases, oﬀering alternative terminology.
This article extends the critique of these categories of analysis, demonstrating that
judicial lawmaking was a constant from 1800 to 1930. What changed, it is contended,
was the conception of the creative process entailed in the act of judging. At the turn of
the nineteenth century, creative acts were still primarily associated with divine power.
However, by mid-century, the power of creation was commonly attributed to human
actors—“without necessary reference to a past divine event.” This shift in usage can
best be understood as a manifestation of the inﬂuence of romanticism in American
culture.
Id. at 156 (citations omitted). In that article, she contested the views of G. Edward White
as well as the legal historians who argued that this period demonstrated movement from
“instrumentalism” to “formalism.” The romanticism to which she refers is the shift from the
sacred to the secular, and her study looks at the impact of this romanticism on American
legal thought. Although her book does not speak in the same terms, one could regard it as
the mature expression of that earlier article, with an expanded cast of characters.
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to wealth accumulation and the growth of the industrial society, paints a false
portrait of unanimity of opinion. Rather, she argues, jurists were faced with
competing accounts of the mind and legal responsibility; more often than
not they chose pragmatically among these accounts, so it is overly simplistic
to characterize American legal developments as a unitary or linear march of
progress. Importantly, in contrast to the usual approaches in the legal history
literature that focus on criminal law, Blumenthal turns her attention to cases in
the areas of wills, family law, contracts (particularly insurance contracts), and
torts. Finally, the third part of this review will outline what is one of the most
powerful, and, in my mind, important contributions of her book—an in-depth
analysis of the intersection of law and medicine in the period under study.
This analysis, as I will note, can be brought to bear on modern conversations
involving law, genetics, and neuroscience.3 Some lessons about the use of
science in law that emerge from her study are worth repeating.
I. The Project: Taking on American Legal History
As I have noted, Blumenthal has, perhaps slyly, titled her book in the same
manner as Jerome Frank, another leading legal historian who in 1930 authored
Law and the Modern Mind. And in an acknowledgment of the connectiveness of
history, she begins her book with a quotation from Oliver Wendell Holmes
that nicely captures the central theme of her own work: “In a proper sense, the
state of a man’s consciousness always is material to his liability” (1).4 Reviewing
materials from the Revolutionary War and the Gilded Age, Blumenthal traces
out how the insinuation of Enlightenment ideas in law and science informed
legal thinking and in turn drew the contours of modern accountability and
responsibility. Although she speaks at various points of the default legal person
(DLP) and of Holmes’s “reasonable man,” she is actually, through studies of
insanity, trying to outline the contours of who is, in the law of the time, the
responsible, accountable “self.” As she states, she “explores the problematic
relationship between consciousness and liability in the history of American
law . . . .” (2). As detailed below, Blumenthal has divided her work into two
parts.5 The ﬁrst part of her book describes the intellectual underpinnings of
the case analysis that informs the second part of her book.
3.

The discussion in Part III will focus on neuroscience; the scope of this review and the
author’s own competence require this narrower gaze. Consider, also: “Genetics may yet
threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous, and gut the concept of human
nature. But neuroscience could do all of these things ﬁrst.” The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your
Mind, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 72, 72.

4.

She notes that this is an odd statement for a jurist whose project was to move us from
subjective to objective standards, creating the “reasonable man” (now, reasonable person)
as the benchmark for legal liability. (1) The Holmes quote is from Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). Blumenthal, however, sees herself as
reversing Holmes’s emphasis on the reasonable person, instead looking at the default legal
person standing behind Holmes’s creation (12)

5.

Blumenthal’s book is drawn, in part, from her own previously published work. See, e.g., A Mania
for Accumulation: The Plea of Moral Insanity in Gilded Age Will Contests, in MAKING LEGAL HISTORY:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WILLIAM E. NELSON 181 (Daniel J. Hulsebosch & R.B. Bernstein eds.,
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At the close of the Revolution, the key challenge to the success of this
experiment in governance was the “mental competence of citizens, on their
ability to exercise a ‘rational liberty’ ” (5). As writings in almost any postRevolutionary ﬁeld demonstrate, creating a republic of free citizens,6
governed by their consent and intelligence rather than by their status, was
simultaneously liberating and disquieting. Many thinkers of the time, trying
to channel this freedom, would look to the Common Sense philosophy of
the Scottish Enlightenment, which provided a scientiﬁc conﬁrmation of the
divine conferral of rational faculties.7 Into this setting Blumenthal places
what she calls “ ‘the default legal person,’ modeled in accordance with the
Enlightenment ‘science of man,’ ” (7)8 and living in the shadow of Holmes’s
“average man.” “In the everyday legal culture lying just outside the jurist’s
imagination, however, these exceptional persons were not so marginal. For
even as Holmes wrote, American courtrooms were regularly confronted with
capacity litigation.”9 Blumenthal, unlike Holmes, focuses on the “exceptional
persons” who were the subject of capacity litigation in order to see what “free
and independent man” would emerge from the chains of status and rank. She
notes that this reversal of emphasis on the “default legal person” leads to four
points of diﬀerence between her DLP and Holmes’s average man:
1.
2.
3.

The DLP marks the border of legal capacity, rather than a bundle of
expectations for conduct.
While failing to behave reasonably led to liability, behaving like a DLP
would typically led to a “suspension or mitigation of liability” (12).
The DLP is a descriptive model—he is the “precondition[] of liability,”
(12) while Holmes’s reasonable man is prescriptive, determined by the
limits of the law.

2013); “Death by His Own Hand”: Accounting for Suicide in Nineteenth-Century Life Insurance Litigation,
in SUBJECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: FRAMING PERSONHOOD IN MODERN BUREAUCRACIES 98
(Andrew Parker, Austin Sarat & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., 2011); The Mind of the Moral
Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century American Law, 26 LAW
& HIST. REV. 99 (2008); The Default Legal Person, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2007) [hereinafter
Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person]; The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959 (2006).
6.

As noted below, Blumenthal makes it clear at various points that these citizens were white
males, and generally property holders.

7.

Although Blumenthal addresses the role that religion plays in the formation of the American
“mind,” it is not a major theme of her work. She notes that over time, legal thinkers moved
from the constraints of Calvinism to a more liberal and broadly couched Protestantism.
Passim, but see e.g., LMM 22, 33–34. 42–44.

8.

Her articulation of this concept is clearer in her article that informs this chapter. Using
Holmes’s “average man,” almost as a foil, she points out that judges “could not see men
as God sees them.” Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, supra note 6, at 1137 (quoting O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881)).

9.

Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, supra note 6, at 1138.
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4. Finally, the DLP has “no particular point of view of his own;” rather he
moves “chameleon-like . . . from case to case”10 (12).
Blumenthal documents the travails of the default legal person as he moves
through the late eighteenth and nineteenth century in order to account for
what judges were really doing in this period. She states, in her article:
In eﬀecting these transpositions, they [judges] suggested that the mental attributes one needed to be a competent legal actor depended upon the
nature of the act involved—whether it was a will, contract, or tort. So, in the
law of wills it was deemed to be essential that the default legal person had the
cognitive and emotional capacity to remember and feel the family ties that
bound him as he disposed of his estate, while in the law of contracts it was
more important that he possessed the ability to make intelligent judgments on
the basis of his own self-interest. Within the law of torts, however, he would
assume several distinct forms. In some instances, he had to be able to form
a malicious intent, but in others, he needed only to be capable of exercising
prudence and foresight; in still others it was enough if he had the capacity to
harm. Yet wherever he stood in nineteenth-century American common law,
the default legal person embodied a mental threshold, serving to illustrate the
preconditions of responsibility, so far as the law was concerned.11

Inherent in this approach is Blumenthal’s challenge to conventional legal
history, which she views as being told largely in “socioeconomic terms” (16).
Rather than viewing doctrinal developments through the lens of economic
development and the approach of the Civil War, Blumenthal prefers to look
at the religious and scientiﬁc inﬂuences on the work of the law, believing that
the concern for an “objective law” had “deeper spiritual roots and higher
ideological stakes than previous scholars have recognized”12 (16). For her, the
person is not only an object of capitalist forces; she sees the person as subject
to his or her own frailties as well as the ﬂuidity of social, economic, and legal
relationships at the time (16). This journey is not linear, as is typically depicted
in legal history. Through the numerous capacity hearings she chronicles, she
10.

This point becomes central later in her book; basically, the legal deﬁnition of capacity is
contingent on the area of law, e.g., contracts, torts, through which the DLP traverses.

11.

Blumenthal, The Default Legal Person, supra note 6, at 1140.

12.

Thus, Blumenthal rejects the accounts of legal historians such as Morton Horowitz, Jerold
Auerbach, and Grant Gilmore who see the formalism of the period as an outgrowth of the
economics of the time. See generally MORTON HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); Grant Gilmore, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). Robert
Cover and William Nelson provide a competing account, focusing on the Civil War and
jurists’ attempts to look to rules of human behavior, values, and religion to justify changes
in the law. See generally ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1976); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974). Holmes, in The Path of the Law,
in a sense combines both approaches of his contemporaries, drawing on economic analysis
as well as the arguments of the anti-slavery formalists. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
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wants to show the reader the “general lack of clarity about the operative norms
of behavior in the household and the market” (16). In the end, not only does
she paint a portrait of the preconditions of legal freedom (i.e., a deﬁnition of
modern mind and personhood), but she also allows the law to make room
for the preconditions of the American character as the courts stepped back
from constraining behavior, “leaving individuals freer, in a certain sense, to
act on their own ideas and impulses, however eccentric, perverse, or just plain
foolish” (17).
Her model of legal history is set forth in Chapter 1, “Common Sense and
Common Law” (26–58). In this chapter, she chronicles the fascination of
American jurists with the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment and its Common
Sense13 philosophy, especially those articulated by Thomas Reid (26–29).
This philosophy, with its focus on the ability to self-make and improve one’s
character through rational processes, was especially appealing to the founding
generation, concerned as it was with the freedom unleashed by the Revolution
(42–44). Here Blumenthal begins to question more traditional legal history,
that, she says, tends to focus on law releasing “creative human energy,” chieﬂy
toward the end of economic development (31). In her view, the traditional
accounts have failed to look at prevailing philosophies of mind to plumb
them for the ways in which they formed and constructed legal personhood.
By contrast, “[t]he mental philosophers and their disciplinary techniques are
placed front and center here” (31). The Common Sense philosophy of the
Scottish Enlightenment, she argues, was central to the project of allowing the
new citizens of the republic to develop the self-knowledge that would make
self-mastery in the face of tremendous freedom possible(42–47). To that end,
she focuses on James Wilson (1742–1798) who in 1766 brought Common Sense
philosophy to America, and was part of the movement from a strict Calvinist
approach of moral blameworthiness to, ultimately, a more forgiving liberal
Protestantism (33–36). By focusing on Reid and Wilson, Blumenthal deftly
but carefully demonstrates the rising hegemony of Scottish Common Sense
philosophy, and how it challenged the idea that responsibility was purely
cognitive or intellectual; that it could also be based on an “excess of passion
rather than a defect of understanding, as it had long been deﬁned at common
law” (41).14 Nonetheless, this view, based on science and religion, had a deep
belief in the ability of people to pursue a virtuous life, contrasted with the
Calvinist belief in “innate human depravity.” Common Sense philosophers
gave more room for human improvement through the exercise of “mental
ability” (42–43). This focus on improvement ﬁt nicely with the concerns about
the vast freedoms given to citizens; exercise of our mental abilities would
allow us to make the best use of the freedoms that had been aﬀorded by the
Revolution.
13.

One interesting point that Blumenthal makes is that the exaltation of “Common Sense”
becomes small-case “common sense” by the arrival of the Gilded Age.

14.

Citing 3 THOMAS REID, THE WORKS OF THOMAS REID: WITH AN ACCOUNT OF HIS LIFE AND
WRITINGS 39–41 (Dugald Stewart ed., New York, Duyckinkck et al., 1822).
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While Common Sense philosophy spurred a great deal of American selfimprovement movements, the philosophy also had the seeds of its own demise
because for jurists, Common Sense philosophy did not provide a clear division
between depravity and disease (50). From this belief in the capacities of the mind
for self-improvement and self-government emerged the default legal person,
who had the capacity for self-knowledge and determination. Challenging
but never fully displacing the British notion of personhood, “[t]he default
legal person stood as the embodiment of widely shared assumptions about
human agency and accountability, constituting a part of the common sense of
the American legal profession in the nineteenth century” (55). Thus, “mental
soundness” was a “legitimate means of discriminating between theoretically
equal individuals for all sorts of legal purposes,” because it supported the
new American legal structure in which “mental ability rather than social status
constituted the primary determinant of legal capacity and responsibility” (57).
What this philosophy could not always answer was whether the legal acts of
individuals were a reﬂection of intentional self-determination, albeit eccentric,
or of a disease, rendering them legally unaccountable (58). To this end,
Blumenthal, in one of her most singular historical contributions, surveys the
role that the medical jurisprudence of insanity placed in the law, in Chapter
2 of the ﬁrst part of her book. As will be dealt with in more detail below,
Blumenthal uses the writings of Dr. Benjamin Rush and the alienists to sketch
out how medical expertise, in the form of treatises and testimony, contributed
to the ﬂeshing out of the default legal person.
The ambitious second part of her book is a veritable travelogue of
adjudicated civil capacity cases that demonstrate her point that judges
“muddled”15 through determinations of personhood, as opposed to acting
15.

William Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling
the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 311–14, 311 at n.47 (1980-81) for the sources cited there
on “muddling through”. Rodgers’ article is directed at judicial perceptions of the forms
of reasoning used by administrative agencies in making decisions: classical, rational/
formal, and the “theory of successive limited comparisons.” He renames the third theory
less elegantly as the “science of muddling through.” Although he is applying this model to
agency behavior, Blumenthal essentially, although in a more carefully documented manner,
describes judges in the period studied as performing the same analysis. Rodgers argues,
as does Blumenthal, that agencies and judges tend to use a “hybrid” approach to decisionmaking that combines features of the classical model (freewheeling proxy for the legislature)
and the rational (the administrator identiﬁes alternatives, projecting consequences to
make the best decision; less political and more scientiﬁc). As this applies to Blumenthal,
she is arguing that legal history has missed the boat in forcing judicial decisions into one
model; rather, judges tend to decide pragmatically based on the evidence before them and
the doctrine at issue rather than as against some grand philosophy. As Rodgers would
say, “decisionmaking is a process of strategic adaptation over time, incremental advance,
and partial resolution . . . . Decisionmaking by the muddlers is a process that bends with
the breeze, rolls with the punch, runs for daylight. It works by ﬁts and starts, by ﬂoating
proposals, by reworking them to blunt anguished objections, by amendment over time.”
Id. at 312. Obviously, nineteenth-century jurists are not modern governmental agencies but
as described by Blumenthal their dilemma is much the same—given the shifting sands of
science and medicine, how does one make an incapacity decision in the case before the
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from some grand philosophy. As developed in greater detail below, Blumenthal
surveys an amazing number of cases to demonstrate how judges dealt with
the contending philosophies laid out in the ﬁrst part of the book. Again and
again, judges struggled with drawing a line between sane and insane, capable
or not accountable.
II. Methodology: Speaker for the Dead and the Insane
In Speaker for the Dead,16 Ender Wiggin, in an act of atonement, undertakes a
life mission to “speak” the truth about the dead as he performs their eulogy—
the good, the bad, and the ambiguities of each person’s existence. “Who was
this speaker, and how did he know so much about things he could not possibly
have known?”17 In a like manner, the dead speak through Blumenthal, telling
us the tale of how modern American legal consciousness was born. The success
of the new republic rested on its citizens, and their moral agency. In this case,
she brings to life, in an unvarnished fashion, at least four groups of actors who
inform the development of consciousness (or legal capacity), and conferrals of
agency, from 1750 to 1900. The ﬁrst group, the focus of her study, is the litigants
in estate, contract, family law, and tort cases that provide the gist of her book,
and from which her thesis is tested and proved. The second group contains
populations that are typically disenfranchised in legal scholarship: married
women and slaves. In fact, one of the remarkable contributions of her book
is to acknowledge that the shaping of the American mind takes place in the
shadow of the disenfranchisement of these two groups. A third group of actors
court at a particular moment in time? The beauty of Blumenthal’s analysis is that she shows,
through her case vignettes, nineteenth-century jurists “muddling through.”
16.

ORSON SCOTT CARD, SPEAKER FOR THE DEAD (1986, 1991)[The author is using the 1991
“author’s deﬁnitive edition.]. Those who are familiar with Card’s book ENDER’S GAME
(2006) know that Ender Wiggin, the main character in that book, was responsible for the
genocide of an entire species. What is less well-known is that Ender’s Game was intended as
a character study or prequel for what was intended to be Card’s main work in Speaker for the
Dead. See “Introduction” at ix to xxii. Relevant also to the power of Blumenthal’s work is
this note of similarity between her close analysis of cases and the work of the Speaker:
The Speaker had done a monstrous thing, to lay these secrets before the whole
community. They should have been spoken in the confessional. Yet Peregrino had
felt the power of it, the way the whole community was forced to discover these people
that they thought they knew, and then discover them again, and then again: and each
revision of the story forced them all to reconceive themselves as well, for they had been
part of this story, too, had been touched by all the people a hundred, a thousand times,
never understanding until now who it was they touched. It was a painful, fearful thing
to go through, but in the end it had a curiously calming eﬀect. The Bishop leaned to
his secretary and whispered, “At least the gossips will get nothing from this—there
aren’t any secrets left to tell.”
Id. at 269. This comparison, between Law and the Modern Mind and Speaker for the Dead, is meant
with respectful seriousness. While the former is styled as a legal history, there is also a sense,
like the latter, that it is an anthropology, and that she lays bare the lives of the litigants,
medical experts, and jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That is, she lets
history speak for itself from the cases rather than imposing an interpretive framework from
one of the legal history theories.

17.

Card (1991 ed.), id. at 263.
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depicted in her careful study are the judges of the relevant period, who speak
through their decisions in the cases that are discussed. Finally, as addressed in
the next section, Blumenthal immerses the reader in a conversation between
jurists and the emerging medical doctors who study the mind. In this section,
the primary focus will be on the parties and the jurists in the cases, as this is
the method by which she proceeds. Brief attention will also be given to the
picture she draws of married women and slaves, who exist on the fringes of
her narrative.
The second unique feature of her approach is a focus on cases that employ
a challenge to one party’s sanity, or legal capacity. Blumenthal’s methodology
is to track how jurists and the medical personnel who testiﬁed in the courts
deﬁned insanity and therefore legal incapacity (the DLP). Unlike many works
of legal history that focus on the criminal sphere, Blumenthal’s book focuses
on the civil sphere in speciﬁc realms: challenges to wills, contracts voided
for a lack of capacity, and divorce and tort liability where family members
often contested the agency and psychological capacity of their loved ones. In
moving from 1750 to 1900, she shows the reader how the law creates room for
the eccentricities of the modern American character as it set the contours of
legal capacity.
Her focus on insanity is revealing, and part of her project is to reveal the
“modern mind” and the contours of legal responsibility. By a type of “reverse
engineering,” she uses the courts’ demarcation of capable personhood from
insane to describe which people were legally moral agents. The study traces
the many conﬂicting attitudes toward insanity in eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury law: Was insanity a disease? Or, rather, was it a sign of moral depravity?
Was it only to be deﬁned by one’s ability to be rational? Or would it consider
moral inclinations and sentiments? This focus is against the backdrop not just
of the courts’ struggle with these cases, but also of the medical professions
and the rise of the asylum. At the same time, she diagnoses the fundamental
anxiety of the new republic: How can the law confer, and yet contain, so much
freedom? That is, the American revolutionary project could be a success only
if citizens could live up to the idea of ordered liberty. Success would be a
moral, political and legal endeavor.
A. The Estate Cases
One of the singular contributions of Blumenthal’s book is her analysis of
myriad capacity cases. “The analysis oﬀered in the chapters that form Part 2 is
based upon over 800 published (usually appellate) opinions” (318 n.18).18 This
strength, however, also makes it diﬃcult to summarize her book because these
cases form the heart of the book; it is hard to pick one, especially since she
18.

She adds: “Many of these cases were identiﬁed in the same way a nineteenth-century lawyer
might have investigated the matter: by mining the notes of leading works on the medical
jurisprudence of insanity as well as legal treatises devoted to discrete doctrinal areas.” (318
n.18)
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surveys several areas of the law. This section will look at her ﬁrst case summary
as an example of her method of analysis.
“By all accounts, George Moore was a dissolute bachelor who drank
himself to death” (105).19 So begins Blumenthal’s ﬁrst account of an incapacity
case. Moore had executed a will that disinherited his three brothers, but
provided for his female slave, who was also described as his concubine.20 Not
surprisingly, the three brothers of this childless man contested his will, arguing
incapacity, undue inﬂuence, and fraud. They presented testimony about a
fever that resulted in animus toward his brothers, while the will’s proponents
called witnesses “who maintained that when this document was made Moore
displayed suﬃcient intellect to competently dispose of his estate” (105).
Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled against the will because
it appeared that Moore’s concubine, to be emancipated upon his death,
appeared to exert undue inﬂuence over him, and that his feelings against his
brothers was seen as “a derangement in one department in his mind” (106).
The basic facts of the case laid out, Blumenthal uses this narrative to regale the
reader with the arguments on rehearing of proponents’ counsel, Joseph Cabell
Breckinridge, who railed against the “new medical psychology” employed by
the contestants that made it diﬃcult to tell the diﬀerence between “sin and
disease” (106). Blumenthal uses this case to note that “the issues . . . posed
recurred with disturbing regularity in the decades that followed, as litigation
about ‘unnatural dispositions’ seemed to crowd court dockets in every state”
(106).
The diﬀering positions about incapacity established, Blumenthal uses
each case as an entry point to analyze the context of the decision. In this
particular case, she sees the decisions as evidence of “a concern that liberty
might degenerate into licentiousness, particularly in a country that had
repudiated so many of the traditional props of social order . . . .” (107).
Canvassing the treatises at the time of the decision, she points out that the
principles “of testamentary freedom and natural justice seemed perpetually
in conﬂict, forcing judges to confront the fact that liberty and morality did
not necessarily lead all men in the same direction” (107). The stage set, she
uses the next two chapters to illustrate the way in which testamentary capacity
battles staked out claims between conventional morality and freedom. But
she also goes deeper to use these cases as exemplars of her thesis that these
cases “are best understood” as exposing the “tensions and ambiguities in the
liberal conception of self-possession.” By presenting so many cases, followed
by close and searching analysis, she describes how traditional legal history
has “overstated the coherence and stability of the behavioral norms invoked”
in this period (108). Her analysis not only carefully dissects each case in its
historical context, but also seeks to reveal a vision of the human will in the civil
context by looking not only at the cases but at the ideas of “[t]he new band of
19.

This is the ﬁrst account in the ﬁrst of her case analysis chapters.

20.

Johnson v. Moore’s Heirs, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 371, 371–72 (1822), referenced at LMM, supra note 2
at 105 n.1. The ensuing description is drawn from id. at 105–07.
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medical men specializing in the diagnosis and treatment of mental alienation”
who “promised a scientiﬁc basis for judgment” (109).21 It is the latter two foci
that make her book unique among legal history texts; she focuses on civil cases,
and introduces in a co-equal way the role of medical personnel in shaping the
law of capacity.
B. The Disenfranchised: Women and Slaves
As noted, those who suﬀered from monomanias, delusions, and other
inﬁrmities of the mind were excluded from legal personhood as the outcome
of contested litigation. But the deﬁnition of legal personhood doesn’t
begin and end with a ﬁnding of insanity. It is a credit to the broad ambit of
Blumenthal’s scholarship that she also considers, in each chapter, the status
of slaves and married women. She acknowledges from the outset that most
of these cases involved white men of property (8).22 That this was the case,
that white maleness was the baseline precondition of “presumed competence,”
meant that “any sign that they had been unmanned could serve as the basis for
claiming incapacity” (100). As noted above, many of her case studies shine a
light on slavery and/or the role of women.
III. Past as Prologue: Science and Law, Then and Now
Antonio: . . . Who’s the next heir of Naples?
Sebastian: Claribel.
Antonio: She that is Queen of Tunis; she that dwells
Ten leagues beyond man’s life; she that from Naples
Can have no note, unless the sun were post—
The man i’ the moon’s too slow—till new-born chins
Be rough and razorable; she that—from whom
We all were sea-swallow’d, though some cast again
And by that destiny to perform an act
Whereof what’s past is prologue, what to come,
In yours and my discharge.23
One theme of this review essay, and undergirded by Blumenthal’s study, is
that the fundamental question of who is a responsible agent has always vexed
those in the law (as well as those in religion, philosophy, and science). By what
theory of mind, in any given period of history, does the law determine that
21.

The question of the will, she notes, has long pre-occupied legal historians who study the
criminal law. See, e.g., THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (2014).

22.

From the beginning, she notes that the jurists of the period say liberty as consistent with
a patriarchal hierarchy that meant a male head of household co-existing with slavery.
Whiteness was the “default” race (8). “Since few white women and even fewer non-white
women or men owned and controlled property, this bias stands to reason, even as it forces us
to reckon with how many property holders perceived themselves or were perceived by others
to be incapable of rationally managing their possessions” (100).
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we are responsible agents? And to what extent should the sciences (including
medicine) be part of that eﬀort? What should be the nature of the partnership
between law and science? Although this book is clearly intended as a work of
legal history, Blumenthal’s book can be read to also speak to contemporary
debates in science and law, particularly in genetics and neuroscience.24
Describing the work of scientists and medical personnel during that age is a
key part of her study, and may be one of the most important contributions that
her books make to legal (and medical) history.
Some readers of this review essay may have owned, as a child, a ViewMaster. This toy was a modern descendant of the stereoscope, and one of
its best salespeople was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (88). Invented in 1838,
the stereoscope allows the viewer’s eyes to see two separate images that are
then fused into one image in the brain, giving the image depth and richness.25
Relying on the underlying metaphor of the stereoscope, Blumenthal tells the
entwined contributions of medicine and law to the burgeoning nineteenthcentury understanding of insanity, and, like the stereoscope, gives the reader
a much deeper and complex understanding of the role and deﬁnition of
insanity in shaping American culture and law, and its view of human nature.
Her account is told largely through the stories of Francis Wharton, a writer of
treatises on medical jurisprudence, and John Ordronaux (1830-1908), a doctor
with a law degree and a pioneer in asylum oversight who worked with lawyers
to craft a better legal regime governing insanity.
Wharton, she writes, promised, like the stereoscope, to bring the focus of
law and medicine into convergence. Unfortunately, she notes, Wharton’s study
of “over 800 appellate decisions” showed more divergence than convergence
regarding the law of insanity (90). By the 1870s, this conﬂict between legal
authorities and medical experts was apparent to the public in both criminal
and civil capacity trials. Public skepticism about the soundness of law or
medicine rose as insanity trials became fodder for newspapers, in which
medical experts frequently disagreed with one another and lawyers appeared
to hire “forensic psychologists [who] would say anything for a price” (90-91).
These disputes were confounded by diﬀering views about method between
lawyers and doctors. Doctors saw the disagreement as a way of testing and
advancing science, while lawyers saw the disagreement as a fruit of adversarial
culture and looked down on “scientiﬁc disagreements as signs of moral
24.

This section of the review will focus on neuroscience, although the issues regarding
accountability that arise in genetics are just as telling.
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Stereoscope, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stereoscope (last updated Aug. 16,
2017, 7:24PM), https://perma.cc/NV2M-73TV. That entry also details Holmes’s reﬁnement
of the stereoscope:
In 1861 Oliver Wendell Holmes created and deliberately did not patent a handheld,
streamlined, much more economical viewer than had been available before. The
stereoscope, which dates from the 1850s, consisted of two prismatic lenses and a wooden
stand to hold the stereo card. This type of stereoscope remained in production for a
century and there are still companies making them in limited production currently.
Id.
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corruption” (91). And like today, all felt that the adversarial jury trial distorted
the presentation of scientiﬁc evidence about insanity (92–93).
Against this backdrop, Blumenthal uses the story of John Ordronaux,
and his rise and fall as the lunacy commissioner for the state of New York as
the lens for this dispute. Ordronaux was active in the movement to codify the
law of the insane as well as to reform and centralize oversight of asylums. He
labored to “minimize” the diﬀerences between law and medicine, pointing
out that while medicine viewed insanity as a departure from one’s natural
mental condition arising from bodily disease, the law saw it more narrowly as
determining whether particular conduct was free (and therefore culpable), or
involuntary (and nonculpable) (92–93). He also, presciently, noted that these
same “physical laws” aﬀected “the judgment process itself” (93). Similarly,
because Ordronaux felt conﬁned to the information about the mind presented by our senses, and that “ ‘no two minds are alike, either in health or in
disease,’ ” Blumenthal describes him as coming “perilously close” to suggesting that evaluation of sanity was subjective, something that his detractors raised also (93–94). But in the end, she notes: “Judging competence thus
proved a profoundly contentious matter, as it became painfully obvious that
there was no ‘common sense of science’—no agreed upon standard that could
be used to distinguish the true from the false expert, let alone to decide who
was actually insane.”26

As the century moved on toward the Gilded Age, advances of science
became increasingly materialist and determinist.
But Blumenthal is very sympathetic to the knot that medical jurists in fact
tied for themselves. In attempting to codify something that was admittedly
“invisible and irreducibly mysterious” (98), medical personnel merely set the
boundaries of argument at trial rather than settling disputes. In a brilliant
segue to Part 2 of her book, Blumenthal summarizes the impact that medical
knowledge had on incapacity trials. As will be familiar to the modern
litigator, she describes litigating incapacity as a fact-intensive enterprise “with
‘voluminous’ transcripts . . . the norm” (99), as it was hoped that the details
could supply what was hidden from view. Shifting to the real object of her
book, she notes that as the middle class became subject to the vagaries of the
market and reliant on the self-made man, who himself was being undercut by
industrial capitalism (99), it was this “self-made man whose capacity was typically
challenged in these proceedings” (100). In these challenges, “psychological
medicine supplied a putatively scientiﬁc explanatory framework as well as an
extensive arsenal of words and phrases for conveying how and why they fell
below the threshold of the default legal person” at the moment of alleged
incapacity (100). In her account, then, capacity trials showcase the fears and
concerns of nineteenth-century Americans about their own self-making (10001). These accounts also are the fodder of her challenge to traditional accounts
26.

This subjectivity, Blumenthal notes, became a problem for both law and medicine (94).
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of “law and the conditions of freedom in nineteenth-century America” (102).27
Responsibility was frequently contested (102), and placing the mind at issue
was a “Pandora’s Box” that, in marking the diﬀerence between capacity and
madness, either became meaningless as too narrow, or tarred everyone with a
touch of madness. In this, she opines, “judges took a pragmatic tack” between
voluntarism and determinism (103). By the end of the century, “Common
Sense” had lost its claim to being capitalized—there was no objective way to
compare individuals, and judges had to pragmatically make their way through
the diﬀerences (103). Ultimately, by the end of the 1800s, all agreed that
“rationality is not the norm”; rather, the monomania of speculation would be
the “main show in town” (104).
Her focus on medical experts is deepened in her subsequent case studies.
For example, in Chapter 3 (“Unnatural Dispositions”), she not only shows the
working of Common Sense philosophy (113), but also introduces the reader to
the medical jurisprudence of alienists. At the beginning of her period of study,
an emerging group of medical experts who styled themselves as “alienists”
came to the fore (109). They questioned traditional common-law notions of
non compos mentis, or insanity, complaining that the courts’ use of the concept
was applied inconsistently (3). Not surprisingly, this emerging medical science
was widely used in the cases that she so carefully describes.28 In case analysis,
she shows how not only jurists were befuddled on the shoals of sin, disease
and depravity, but so too were medical jurists (114–17). The medical experts
often contested legal outcomes, and she uses this to show that it was not
only in criminal law that jurists and medical experts had to ﬁnd a boundary
“between disease and depravity” as society became more secularized as well
as medicalized (117). The cases in her two chapters about wills, then, show
not only a growing secularization of legal doctrines and a wider ambit for
eccentricity and freedom, but also the development of early psychology as it
addressed manias, delusions, and self-alienation as alternative explanations to
sin or depravity for human behavior. Her point, and mine, is that this history,
especially given the contemporary focus on neuroscience,29 can show us the
choices that a judge makes in each individual case have a bearing not just
on the rights of the litigants, but also on the deﬁnition of human nature, free
will, American culture, and the limits of science’s role in the courtroom. Each
case is a picture of how we as a society navigate the bounds of freedom and
27.

This is also a none-too-veiled reference to JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).
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She deﬁnes their use of alienation as follows: “This term of art denoted a loss of reason that
might be partial or total, entailing an estrangement or dispossession of the self, such that the
suﬀerer was no longer in his or her right mind” (3).
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Perhaps the most salient diﬀerence between nineteenth- and twentieth-century psychology
and modern neuroscience is that rather than deducing insanity from outward manifestations
of behavior, we can now, with imaging technologies, both structural and functional, look
inside the brain. Although, as will be noted below, these technologies are not without their
limits, both scientiﬁcally and legally, it should come as no surprise that many of the basic
questions about freedom and the operation of the human will stay the same.
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responsibility. And, as it pertains to contemporary developments, in which
neuroscience challenges the “folk psychology” of the courtroom, her history
allows one to see the contested terrain in which folk psychology developed.
These debates, about the role of science in the courtroom, have not changed.
That said, two developments change the framework of the debate. The most
salient scientiﬁc diﬀerence now is that modern imaging technologies allow us to
look into the black box of the mind. On the legal side, some of the evidentiary
conundrums have been resolved in the adoption of evidentiary standards
for the admission of expert evidence about mental conditions.30 Modern
neuroscience and law, however, continue to ask the same questions: What is
consciousness? Capacity? Who is responsible? Are we determined, or do we
have free will? But it is important to see the historical connections between the
accounts of medical jurisprudence in Blumenthal and today’s debate about
free will, because the latter are the direct descendants of the former and may
well have as great an impact on American law and the deﬁnition of the default
legal person as they did in earlier times. That is, the default legal person lives.
On the scientiﬁc side, new imaging technologies mean that the brain is
not quite the black box that it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth and even
twentieth centuries.31 Technologies such as functional magnetic resonance
imaging and electroencephalograph allow scientists to “see” both structure
and function in the brain. In many cases, they have allowed us to understand
that there are, indeed, many types and causes of insanity and to see that many
types of insanity are organic.
New cases, like the ones depicted by Blumenthal but taking place in the
late 1900s and early twenty-ﬁrst century, reveal contemporary thinking about
the default legal person. Consider, for example, litigation about adolescents.
Is the adolescent a legally capable adult? In what circumstances? For example,
30.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 regarding experts, interpreted in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert replaces the Frye standard [Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923)] in the federal courts. Both standards, however, provide the presiding judge
with a set of tools for the admission of expert evidence. Although both look to the reception
of the science in its relevant community, the Daubert test goes further in announcing a set of
factors that the judge, as gatekeeper, must consider before admitting an expert. If this test
had existed in the nineteenth century, it may have resolved some of the debates.

31.

Neuroscience is a relatively new area of study; its involvement with the law is even newer. To
date, there is only one casebook in this area: OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS
X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014) [hereinafter JONES ET AL.]. Teaching from this
casebook inspires the subsequent discussion and comparison. For those who seek further
information, I recommend two sources. First, Francis X. Shen, Keeping Up with Neurolaw: What
to Know and Where to Look, 50 COURT REV. 104 (2014) (a three-page guide to bibliographic
and other resources). Second, the comprehensive website for the MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Law and Neuroscience, http://lawneuro.org/, contains, among other
features, an exhaustive bibliography of articles and books on the topic. Law and Neuroscience
Bibliography, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON L. & NEUROSCIENCE, http://lawneuro.
org/bibliography.php (last visited 30 August 2017).
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in Roper v. Simmons,32 the Supreme Court, in light of evidence about adolescent
brain development, concluded that a juvenile oﬀender could not be put to
death for a capital crime because of maturational diﬀerences between the
adult and adolescent brain. This decision, like many of Blumenthal’s cases,
was informed by medical and psychological expertise.33 But again, as with
Blumenthal’s cases, this is contested territory. (Consider, in Roper, the dissent
of Justice Scalia that questioned the science in this case and its use.34) A danger
exists here, though, that perhaps we did not face in the nineteenth century.
Modern neuroscience and medicine have the potential, as yet not reached,
of demonstrating every person as having a unique mind. Do we face a day in
which our variability, both genetically and neurologically, is so diverse that we
all will require capacity hearings? That is, perhaps we are in danger that we are
all unique, so that lines may be meaningless?
As Blumenthal aptly points out throughout her book, the question of will
versus determinism bedeviled nineteenth-century psychologists and jurists.
Although our terminology has changed—now it is determinists, compatibilists,
etc.—the debate has not. Moreover, these new technologies have not resolved
the debate about free will. Medical jurisprudence, now as then, is all over the
board on whether we are determined or have free will.35 But more importantly,
32.

543 U.S. 551 (2005). Along these same lines, see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (a
juvenile oﬀender cannot be sentenced to life without parole in a nonhomicide crime, again
relying in part on psychological evidence).
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See, e.g., Brief for the American Psychological Association, and the Missouri Psychological
Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03–633), 2004 WL 1636447.

34.

As the casebook authors, JONES ET AL., supra note 73, point out, there is the additional
empirical diﬃculty of when is it appropriate to use group-averaged data in an individual
case—the G2i problem. Similarly, consider the objections of law professor Stephen J. Morse,
in Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
397 (2006), who suggests that the addition of neuroscientiﬁc evidence adds little beyond
what parents and others can already “observe” about adolescents. Id. at 409–10. Others
have pointed out that the same psychologists have argued that female adolescents, on
the other hand, can make mature decisions about abortion, pointing out that this type of
reﬂective decision draws upon diﬀerent areas of the brain and a diﬀerent social context than
impulsive, peer-based decisions to engage in criminal behavior. See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and
the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 583 (2009). This diﬀerence, however, is not
counter to Blumenthal’s argument—indeed, part of her argument is that capacity varies
depending upon doctrinal context. The same point seems to be emerging in modern uses of
neuroscience.
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Compare the following, all excerpted in JONES ET AL., supra note 73, at 121–47 (Chapter 5:
Behavior and Responsibility—Views from Law and Neuroscience,: Patricia Churchland, Do We Have Free
Will?, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 18–24, 2006, at 42; Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Future
of Personhood and Responsibility, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
113 (Jeﬀrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011); Jerry A. Coyne, You Don’t Have Free Will,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, at B6; Hilary Bok, Want to Understand Free Will? Don’t
Look to Neuroscience, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, at B8; Owen D. Jones, The End of
(Discussing) Free Will, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012, at B9; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Free
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modern neuroscience suggests that categories such as the reasonable person
or the DLP may prove, increasingly, irrelevant. Some writers in this area,
particularly Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, of the “trolley problem”
imaging studies, have suggested that perhaps the issue is that modern science
may not leave room for concepts of personhood as traditionally understood
in law and philosophy.36 In their view, although this is contested, the person
is “disappearing,” as modern science can pinpoint the causes of behavior.37 In
this light Blumenthal’s study takes on tremendous import in showing us how
we have traveled from notions of free will into conceptions of determinism that
emerge from the nascent psychological sciences of the late nineteenth century.
Conclusion
In 2017, Susanna Blumenthal’s book deservedly won the Merle Curti
Award for intellectual history from the Organization of American Historians.
My abbreviated summary does not do justice to her meticulous research or to
the sweeping breadth of her work. As I read in another review of a diﬀerent
Will Is an Illusion, but You’re Still Responsible for Your Actions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012,
at B7; Paul Bloom, Free Will Does Not Exist. So What?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 23, 2012,
at B10.
36.

See, e.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything,
359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004). They state:
We argue that current legal doctrine, although oﬃcially compatibilist, is ultimately
grounded in intuitions that are incompatibilist and, more speciﬁcally, libertarian.
In other words, the law says that it presupposes nothing more than a metaphysically
modest notion of free will that is perfectly compatible with determinism. However,
we argue that the law’s intuitive support is ultimately grounded in a metaphysically
overambitious, libertarian notion of free will that is threatened by determinism and,
more pointedly, by forthcoming cognitive neuroscience . . . . We argue that new
neuroscience will continue to highlight and widen this gap. That is, new neuroscience
will undermine people’s common sense, libertarian conception of free will and the
retributivist thinking that depends on it, both of which have heretofore been shielded
by the inaccessibility of sophisticated thinking about the mind and its neural basis.
Id. at 1776.
Greene further develops his work in MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP
BETWEEN US AND THEM (2013). As with the nineteenth century, most of the scholarship in
neuroscience has focused on criminal law. See, e.g., Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and
the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787 (2004).
More recently, two leading scientists have written book-length studies about humans,
violence, and neuroscience: STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY
VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2011); ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS
AT OUR BEST AND WORST (2017).
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Of course, such arguments are still subject to the naturalistic fallacy, a.k.a. the is/ought
problem. For example, Amanda Pustilnik quite aptly points out that even though we know
a great deal about the mechanism and operation of pain in the human organism, the concept
of “pain” still has heuristic value as a label that notes the existence and level of moral and
legal objections to certain types of behavior. Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic:
How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012).
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work: “For a full account, you need to read the book.”38 I hope that this book
will be read by more than her fellow legal historians, because scholars from
all the doctrinal areas on which she touches could beneﬁt from her insights
about the formation of the modern mind, and responsibility, in the disparate
disciplines of tort, contract, estates, wills, etc., all richly covered in her book.
Blumenthal presents a convincing and compelling legal history of a critical
and formative period of American history. Rather than characterize it in
sweeping generalizations, as prior generations of legal historians have done,
she drills down into an amazing database of cases and treatises to show us
what judges, litigants, and medical experts thought they were doing—that
is, she allows them to speak for themselves rather than imposing a particular
view of history on them. In doing so, she liberates them from the conﬁnes
of traditional scholarship and paints a rich, multidimensional portrait of
the development of the modern American character. Her unique focus on
consciousness, broadly construed, means that she focuses not just on the
law and the capacity decisions she so deftly summarizes, but also on the coextensive philosophical, religious, and medical debates of the time.
As the United States wrestled with notions of freedom, and moved toward
an industrial society, she shows us how modern Americans were not only
self-made, but all too often unmade in their pursuit of wealth and freedom.
With regular references to the status of married women and slaves, she also
shows a slow movement to enlarge the category of default legal person. While
it is diﬃcult to capture 150 years of the history she covers in this review, be
assured that by her last torts-based chapter, she is demonstrating to the reader
the contested basis of Holmes’s “average man” as a juridical construct, and
preparing one for the continuing debates that would be staged over liability,
responsibility, freedom, and consciousness in the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst
centuries. Her nuanced study of the precursors of modern American law
allow the reader to more fully understand and appreciate the tensions and
inconsistencies in the treatment of capacity and consciousness; those tensions
exist today because they existed yesterday.
Although she writes about the period from 1750 to 1900, I have attempted
above to extend the salience of her argument to the modern contested terrain of
neuroscience and law. Because the same ﬁghts are still taking place, the lessons
in Blumenthal’s text are even more important. While the major contribution of
her book is a careful and successful challenge to legal history orthodoxy about
the formation of the American mind, she also teaches at least three lessons as
we go forward. First and foremost: Science is useful for the formation of legal
doctrine, and consumers of science should be aware that the science may be as
contested as the law. In fact, we ignore it at our peril. And, invoking the image
38.

James Gorman, Challenging Mainstream Thought About Beauty’s Big Hand in Evolution, N.Y. TIMES
(May 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/29/science/evolution-of-beauty-richardprum-darwin-sexual-selection.html?_r=0 (reviewing RICHARD O. PRUM, THE EVOLUTION OF
BEAUTY: HOW DARWIN’S FORGOTTEN THEORY OF MATE CHOICE SHAPES THE ANIMAL WORLD—
AND US) (2017)).
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of the stereoscope, it may not always be possible to conform two diﬀerent
notions of “truth” into one uniﬁed picture given the diﬀerent aims of law
and science. Second, I suspect that the judicial pragmatism that she depicts,
the muddling through, is as alive today as it was over a hundred years ago.
Although channelized through the Rules of Evidence and Daubert, contested
litigation about legal capacity still draws heavily on scientiﬁc expertise, and
judges show a careful and cautious approach to the use of that science. Finally,
I think that one of her most valuable insights is that the application of science
in these cases is not transsubstantive. Going hand in hand with the pragmatism
she reveals, the medical jurisprudence tends to lead to diﬀering results and/or
analyses in each doctrinal area. It would be fascinating, say, a hundred years
from now for a legal historian of Blumenthal’s bent to look at capacity cases
in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
My minor qualms with the book are largely structural. As is the case with
many scholarly books, the practice of using endnotes rather than footnotes is
frustrating. This is especially true for legal scholarship in which the footnote
is an art form; it often does more than identify a source—it helps to develop
an argument. Second, and more pointedly, this book is based upon a decade
of research and published law review articles. At times, a lack of editing for
consistency means that some of the clarity is lost. Given the depth of detail
Blumenthal uses to make her argument, this is an important point. For
example, at times, references to the legal scholars she is critiquing are oblique
rather than explicit.39 A better job of transitioning her articles to book form
would have improved the ease of grasping her argument.
These points should not, however, obscure the majesty of what she has
accomplished in revealing, without imaging equipment, no less, the modern
American mind.
Leaves, Leaves, lean forth and tell me what I am. Indeed.

39.

An example involving Willard Hurst supports this point. At page 30 of her book, she
states: “One of the most durable narratives in the history and historiography of nineteenthcentury America has cast the law in the role of providing ‘the conditions of freedom.’” In
the endnotes associated with that discussion, note 11 references the work of Hurst, as well
as Morton J. Horwitz, Lawrence Friedman, etc. One might have been tempted to insert
into this sentence, “as Hurst would say” before “the conditions of freedom” to signal to the
reader the provenance of this phrase. This is a very small point, but for the uninitiated, it
would be a helpful clariﬁcation. Similarly, another reference to “law and the conditions of
freedom in nineteenth-century America” appears at page 102, and is not footnoted. Again,
for the newcomer to this literature, a fuller explanation of the received wisdom and clearer
references to their work, in either the text or the footnotes, would have been appreciated.

